










Jeffrey P. Carpenter 




















DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE 
MIDDLEBURY, VERMONT 05753 
 
http://www.middlebury.edu/~econ 
 Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or
Reciprocity?∗
Jeﬀrey P. Carpenter† Peter Hans Matthews‡
March 2, 2005
Abstract
The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaﬀected third
parties sanction oﬀenders. Given the renewed interest of economists
in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin,
however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed
to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation
and group reciprocity. We ﬁnd evidence in favor of both, with the caveat
that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than
earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second
parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene
primarily to promote eﬃciency.
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11 Introduction
Four decades have passed since the infamous murder of Kitty Genovese in
Queens, New York, in 1964, but for those concerned about life in urban America,
her name still resonates. It is not the crime itself that continues to shock us,
but rather the indiﬀerence of all those who heard her cries. Most of us want to
believe such widespread indiﬀerence to the violation of basic norms remains the
exception and not the rule. This belief is reﬂected in our rhetorical conventions.
There would be little reason to describe some crimes as committed "in broad
daylight," for example, if the increased likelihood of observation did not also
mean an increased likelihood of intervention. In this context, the experimental
work of psychologists and sociologists on "bystander intervention," much of it
inspired by the Genovese case, provided some reassurance: Latane and Darley
(1970), Borofsky, Stollack and Meese (1971) and Shotland and Straw (1976), for
example, would all conclude that the impulse to intervene was, if not universal,
not exceptional.
Most economists now accept the notion that the existence and at least lim-
ited local enforcement of norms is characteristic of all human societies (Henrich
et al, 2001). One manifestation of the increasingly sociological perspective on
exchange is a now substantial literature on norm enforcement. With few excep-
tions, however, the data are experimental, and all but a handful of these studies
are concerned with second party punishment or SPP.1 Consider, for example,
experiments using the voluntary contribution mechanism or VCM, the focus of
this paper. Fehr and Gächter (2000) allowed subjects to punish one another, at
some cost to themselves, and found that free riders were often sanctioned, and
that punishment, anticipated or otherwise, was associated with an increase in
mean contributions. Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2003) replicated
these results and then considered a second treatment in which punishment was
non-monetary, and concluded that even these sanctions were eﬀective, albeit
less so. A potential problem with the Masclet et al protocol - the punish-
ment points were (also) costless to send - was remedied in Carpenter, Daniere
and Takahashi’s (2004) ﬁeld experiment in southeast Asian urban slums, which
1One of the exceptions is Stutzer and Lalive’s (2004) paper, which documents the eﬀect
of work norms, and the attendant social pressures on those without work, on the duration of
jobless spells and on self-reported "happiness" of unemployed Swiss workers.
2found that even poor contributors were prepared to reduce their earnings to
show their disapproval of free riders. In related work, Bochet, Page and Put-
terman (2003) have demonstrated that communication before contributions are
made is an imperfect substitute for ﬁnancial sanctions. Walker and Halloran
(2004) and Gächter and Herrman (2005) have discerned evidence of norm en-
forcement even in one-shot experiments, which demonstrates that not all SPP
is instrumental, used either to increase one’s own payoﬀ or the future payoﬀs of
group members.
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) have observed, however, that the direct eﬀects
of norm violations are often circumscribed in the ﬁeld, which leads them to
conclude that most norms would not survive if second parties alone imposed
sanctions. In their view, enforcement often requires the intervention of un-
aﬀected bystanders or third party punishment (TPP), the sort of action that
could have beneﬁtted Ms. Genovese. The experimental literature on TPP
is both thinner, however, and much newer.2 In fact, to motivate their own
contribution to the literature, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) cite just two other
papers: Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee (2002) and an earlier version
(Carpenter and Matthews, 2002) of this one.
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) examine both the extent and possible causes
of TPP in one shot dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games, and ﬁnd that a
substantial number of third parties sanction violations of distributive or coop-
erative norms but that, consistent with Carpenter and Matthews (2002), TPP
is weaker than SPP. In fact, the level of TPP observed in their experiment was
insuﬃcient to render antisocial behavior unproﬁtable though, as the authors
themselves note, this could be an artifact of the design, in which there is only
one third party.
This paper extends the norm enforcement literature in several directions.
First, we consider TPP in the context of VCMs, a framework of obvious in-
terest to economists (e.g., as models of the provision of public goods or team
production).3 In particular, each of our experimental sessions comprised two
2Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler’s (1986) prescient paper, which included a brief discussion
of TPP in dictator games, is the notable exception.
3In a survey of student attitudes about team production, for example, we found that almost
half of all respondents claimed that they would sanction "shirkers" on other teams, a result
with important implications for the evolultion of "factory culture." For more details, see
Carpenter, Matthews and Ong’ong’a (2004).
3parallel, one shot, VCMs. In our baseline treatment, there were no opportuni-
ties to punish either within or across groups. In the second, SPP treatment,
participants could only sanction members of their own group, similar to Walker
and Halloran (2004) and Gächter and Herrman (2005). Three other treatments
allowed for SPP and some form of TPP, with important diﬀerences. In the
third, one-way TPP, members of one group could punish members of the other,
but not vice versa. The fourth and ﬁfth treatments, two-way sequential TPP
and two-way simultaneous TPP, allowed all subjects to punish both within and
across groups but in the former, one foursome’s TPP decisions were revealed to
the other before the latter made their decisions, while in the latter, the sanctions
were made, and revealed, at the same time.
Second, we avoid a possible demand eﬀect present in earlier TPP experi-
ments. If all that third parties are allowed to do is punish - so that participa-
tion in the experiment is equivalent to norm enforcement - there is reason to be
concerned that more will be spent on TPP than otherwise would be. Under
our protocol, there are no isolated third parties: participants were ﬁrst and
foremost contributors to their own VCM. To the extent that their contribution
decisions inﬂuenced how much was later available to spend on sanctions, there
is reason to believe that any unearned income eﬀect was also attenuated.
Third, and perhaps most important, our choice of treatments facilitates a
richer discussion of the possible causes of TPP. On one hand, we believe that
the desire to punish non-cooperators in the other foursome is at least in part
a manifestation of what Elster (1998) calls the "action tendencies" of speciﬁc
emotions. He observes, for example, that "if I believe that another has violated
my interest, I may feel anger; if I believe that in doing so he has also violated
an o r m ,If e e lindignation" (Elster 1998, 48, emphasis added). In the context
of our experiment, we conjecture that anger drives SPP but indignation moti-
vates TPP. In particular, our indignation hypothesis asserts that when third
parties punish, it is the violation of the norm itself that prompts them to do
so, a proposition that does not preclude the existence of an inverse relationship
between the likelihood, or level, of punishment and social distance.
On the other hand, the group reciprocity hypothesis asserts that members
of diﬀerent groups will sometimes exchange gifts of norm enforcement with
one another. If the exchange is sequential, so that individuals are able to
4condition their gifts on those oﬀered to their group, then the reciprocity is simple
(Heijden, Nelissen and Potters, 1999). But if the exchange is simultaneous,
individuals must condition on the expectation of gifts (Sugden, 1984), in which
case reciprocity is said to be complex.
It follows, then, that in the one-way treatment, TPP is the result of indigna-
tion alone, while in the two-way treatments, both indignation and the exchange
of enforcement gifts across groups are responsible. The diﬀerence between TPP
in the one- and two-way treatments is thus a measure of the diﬀerential eﬀect
of either simple or complex group reciprocity.
2 Design Details and Predictions
Weadopted a one-shot framework becausewe wanted to eliminate some common
instrumental explanations for punishment. In a repeated VCM, contributors
may choose to punish members of their own group because they believe that
punishment will increase how much their "targets" contribute in the future,
thereby increasing their own future payoﬀs or, in the case of altruists, because
they simply want to beneﬁt other contributors. A similar logic applies to pun-
ishment outside one’s group. As unaﬀected bystanders, the contributors in one
group may punish the free riders in another when engaged in indirect reciprocity
(Alexander 1987) or, as altruists, to beneﬁt other contributors. Punishment
cannot be instrumental, however, when there are no future rounds.
Most VCM experiments report initial contribution levels close to 50 percent,
a dramatic result inasmuch as the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing.4
There is some concern, however, that the common choice of splitting one’s to-
ken endowment equally is more a reﬂection of participant confusion than coop-
eration. In their VCM experiment, for example, Houser and Kurzban (2002)
found that the mean contribution was close to half the endowment, despite the
fact that players knew that the other members of their group were robots who
"chose" their contributions independently. They estimated, in fact, that more
than half the tokens contributed could be attributed to confusion. Because con-
fusion is a particular concern in one-shot experiments, a number of measures
were taken to ensure that our participants understood, and considered carefully,
4Ledyard (1995) reviews the standard VCM literature. The same is also true, however,
for VCMs with SPP (Carpenter, 2004).
5the experiment.
First, participants read the lengthy instrunctions at their own pace and
were required to answer three control questions correctly before being allowed
to continue.5 Second, inspired by the discussion in Manski (2002), each partic-
ipant was asked to enumerate some of their beliefs before deciding how much
to contribute. In particular, each was ﬁrst asked to estimate how much, on
average, others would contribute and then how much others would spend to
punish someone who did not contribute anything. In addition to encouraging
the participants to think about what might happen in the experiment, the ﬁrst
set of beliefs allowed us to examine the extent to which conditional coopoera-
tion (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001) motivated our participants, while
the second allowed us to test whether diﬀerences in contributions were due to
diﬀerences in anticipated punishment.
The experiment was conducted over a network of personal computers in a
large lab at Middlebury College, which ensured anonymity by allowing con-
siderable space between the participants while they made their choices. The
experimental parameters were as follows: there were 25 sessions (ﬁve sessions
per treatment) with two four-person groups; each participant was endowed with
25 experimental monetary units or EMUs; and the marginal per capita return
on contributions to the public good was 0.5. Because the contribution decisions
of each group beneﬁtted only the members of that group - in other words, free
riding in one group had no eﬀect on the gross earnings of the other - the members
of the other group were unaﬀected bystanders. After participants made their
contribution choices, they were given feedback about the group total contribu-
tion, the contribution choices of the other participants and their gross payoﬀ.
In the punishment treatments the participants were then able to "reduce" the
earnings of a subset of the other players. The size of the subset depended on
the treatment and each EMU spent out of a participants gross earnings from
the ﬁrst stage reduced the ﬁnal earnings of the target by 2 EMUs.
In the SPP treatment, participants could only punish the other three players
in their group. In the one-way TPP treatment, one group could punish only
within their group, but members of the other group could punish players in both.
In the simultaneous TPP treatment, each participant could punish any of the
5For purposes of illustration, we include the instructions for the two-way simultaneous
treatment in the appendix.
6other participants. Finally, in the sequential TPP treatment each participant
could again punish any other participant, but one group made their punishment
choices before the other group and the second-moving group was told how much
each member of the ﬁrst-moving group had spend on TPP but not who they
punished.
There was one other diﬀerence between our protocol and the standard VCM
experiment. After the experiment was ﬁnished, each participant responded to
a six question survey. We collected demographics (sex, whether the participant
was an economics major, number of economics classes taken, grade point aver-
age, and math and verbal SAT scores) to control for any potential non-random
assignment to treatment.
Under the indignation hypothesis, contributions will be higher in the one-
way TPP treatment than in the SPP treatment, and under the group reci-
procity hypothesis, contributions will be higher still in the simultaneous TPP
and sequential TPP treatments. Further, because simple reciprocity is easier
to achieve, contributions should be higher in the sequential TPP than in the
simultaneous TPP. In sum, if both hypotheses are correct, the predicted rank
order of contributions is:
VCM < SPP < One-way TPP < Simultaneous TPP < Sequential TPP
Controlling for the norm-speciﬁc level of free-riding, we expect there to be
more expenditure on punishment in the TPP treatments than in the SPP treat-
ments. Speciﬁcally, if indignation motivates norm enforcers, there will be at
least some TPP in the one-way treatment and, if SPP and TPP are not perfect
substitutes, more punishment in total. When group reciprocity is possible,
there should be even more TPP. And because of the diﬃculties of complex
reciprocity, the predicted order of punishment expenditures is the same:
SPP < One-way TPP < Simultaneous TPP < Sequential TPP
3 Descriptive Statistics
Our subject pool was large (200 participants) and well-paid (average earnings
were $21 in sessions that seldom lasted more than 40 minutes) for a one-shot
7experiment. The behavior of our subjects is summarized in Table 1.
Two characteristics of our descriptive statistics stand out. First, the order-
ing of average contributions is as predicted, consistent with both the indignation
and group reciprocity hypotheses, despite the fact that the correlation between
participant expectations of how much others will contribute and treatment is
small. Second, and perhaps more important, participant expectations of how
much a free rider will be punished correspond to the observed contribution lev-
els in the ﬁve treatments. For example, the participants not only contributed
the most in the sequential TPP treatment, they anticipated that there would
be less toleration for free riding in this treatment, too.
While the focus of later sections is TPP, the data in Table 1 allow for some
interesting comparisons between SPP and TPP. As most would expect, par-
ticipants were, with few exceptions, more likely to engage in, and spend more
money on, SPP than TPP, which suggests that anger is a stronger motivation
than either indignation or group reciprocity. Furthermore, it seems that SPP
and TPP promote diﬀerent ends. Figure 1 plots the mean number of EMUs
spent to punish individual participants as a function of their deviation from
the group average contribution. SPP is directed at both those participants
who contribute less than the average and, to a lesser extent, those who con-
tribute more SPP, in other words, enforces conformism. This is not true of
TPP, however, which seems to be directed entirely at those who fall short of the
contribution norm.
Average Second Party Punishment Per Deviation 
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Figure 1: Norm Enforcement (second and third party punishment)
8The overall incidence of indignation also appears to be low relative to that
reported in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). In our experiment, only 10 percent
of participants punished outside their group in the one-way TPP treatment,
compared to the approximately 60 percent who punished selﬁsh dictators in
theirs. We would argue, however, that this is still a compelling number, because
there was no reason other than indignation to engage in TPP. Nevertheless,
bystander intervention triples when group reciprocity is possible.
We also list the mean levels of the demographics that we collected in our
post-experiment survey at the bottom of Table 1. With the exception of some
variation in the number of economics majors or experience in economics classes
between treatments, most of the diﬀerences are small. Based on these factors,
then, we achieved (at least partial) randomization into treatment.
4 Norm Enforcement and Contributions
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 reports the results for a double-censored tobit model
of individual contributions. Inasmuch as there were few censored observations
(four on the left and ﬁve on the right), the estimates are all close to the mar-
ginal eﬀects conditional on a positive contribution.6 The order of the estimated
treatment eﬀects is as predicted: smallest in the standard VCM, then mutual
monitoring, one-way TPP, two-way simultaneous and ﬁnally two-way sequen-
tial. Furthermore, all but the mutual monitoring coeﬃcient are signiﬁcant,
relative to the VCM benchmark, at the 10 percent level or better and (not
shown) the diﬀerence between the point estimates of the two-way treatments is
also statistically signiﬁcant.
[Table 2 about here]
From another perspective, if one starts with the observation that the mean
predicted contribution was 11.0 EMUs in the baseline VCM treatment, the
increase of almost one EMU under the mutual monitoring treatment is per-
haps less impressive than ﬁrst seems because the estimated coeﬃcient is not
signiﬁcant at the 10, or even 20, percent level.7 The increase of more than one-
6Full details of the decompositions are available on request from the authors.
7Walker and Halloran (2004) also ﬁnd that SPP is much less eﬀective in one-shot environ-
ments.
9and-a-half EMUs from the VCM to the one-way TPP treatment, on the other
hand, is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, which implies that the combination
of anticipated anger and indignation can induce (more) cooperation.
It comes as little surprise, then, that the combination of anger, indigna-
tion and group reciprocity produces an eﬀect (relative to the VCM benchmark)
that is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level: the estimated increase in individual
contributions is more than two-and-a-half EMUs in the two-way simultaneous
treatment, and almost three-and-a-half in the two-way sequential. It is less
clear, however, is how much complex reciprocity adds to this combination: a
one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the simultane-
ous and one-way TPP coeﬃcients is less than or equal to zero can be rejected at
the 10, but not 20, percent level. Because complex reciprocity is predicated on
the resolution of a(nother) coordination problem (Heijden, Nelissen and Potters,
1999), this is not unexpected.
There is much less doubt about the importance of simple reciprocity, how-
ever: as mentioned above, the diﬀerence between the two-way simultaneous and
two-way sequential coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant. The contribution levels observed
in the last treatment, in other words, result from indignation and the possibili-
ties for group reciprocity.
The same column also evinces the importance of conditional or expectations-
based cooperation in our experiment. The estimated coeﬃcient on the expected
average contribution is both substantial and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Participants contributed almost 0.6 EMUs more when the expected mean con-
tribution of other participants increased 1 EMU.8
Last, we note that none of the demographic variables are signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level, from which we conclude that none of the previous results are
the consequence of non-randomization into treatment.
In the second two columns of Table 2, we examine some of the mechanisms
that could explain the diﬀerences in contributions that we observe. There is the
obvious direct eﬀect of the TPP treatments on contributions, but there are also
two plausible indirect eﬀects. First, participant i might contribute more because
she expected more punishment to be meted out under TPP. Second, to extend
this idea one step further, participant i might also anticipate that in response to
8Conditional on a positive contribution, the marginal eﬀect is 0.598. This estimate is
remarkably close to the 0.625 reported in Fehr and Fischbacher (2003).
10expected TPP, others will increase their own contributions, too. Because the
representative participant is conditionally co-operative (recall that the estimated
coeﬃcient on expected average contribution in the ﬁrst column is both positive
and signiﬁcant), it seemsreasonable to suppose that shewould react to this belief
by expecting the average contribution level to rise, and therefore to contribute
more herself.
The second column of Table 2 considers the same model estimated over a
restricted sample, one in which observations from the VCM have been omitted.
In this "all punishment treatments" model, the benchmark becomes SPP, and
consistent with the ﬁrst column, there is limited, but far from decisive, evi-
dence of indignation-driven TPP. The evidence in favor of group reciprocity
is much stronger: contributions in the two-way sequential TPP treatment are
signiﬁcantly higher than under mutual monitoring.
The rationale for the second column, however, is to allow for comparisons
with the third, in which another variable, the expected average punishment, has
been added to the restricted sample. Adding the expected punishment for con-
tributing nothing allows us to test whether participant expectations about TPP
are behind the results in the ﬁrst column. In particular, we were interested to
see whether or not the estimated treatment coeﬃcients became smaller in size
and/or statistically insigniﬁcant, as one would expect if contribution decisions
reﬂected diﬀerences in exposure to punishment across treatments. Although
the coeﬃcient on expected punishment is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and
the treatment coeﬃcients are smaller, so that a channel from norm enforce-
ment to contributions does exist, the reduction in TPP treatment coeﬃcients
is modest (7 percent for the simultaneous treatment and 15 percent for the se-
quential treatment) and the p-values do not fall dramatically (from 0.07 to 0.09
for the simultaneous and from 0.01 to 0.03 for the sequential). Further, in an
unreported regression, we found that despite the positive correlation between in-
dividual expectations about contributions and the punishment of free riders, the
estimated coeﬃcient was only signiﬁcant at the 20 percent level. This suggests
to us that participants did indeed increase their contributions in expectation of
treatment diﬀerences in TPP, but that they did not necessarily anticipate that
other participants would react in the same way.
115 Norm Enforcement Mechanisms
If norm enforcement in our experiment is the result of both indignation and
reciprocity, what, exactly, is the norm that is enforced? It is this question that
motivates Table 3, which reports the estimates for three double-censored random
eﬀects tobit models of individual i’s expenditure on TPP of individual j,e a c h
of which embodies a diﬀerent situational norm.9 The norms are situational
in the sense that when no one else has contributed, for example, a decision
not to contribute is not perceived as a violation. Each model includes both
two-way simultaneous and two-way sequential TPP treatment indicators (the
omitted category is one-way TPP) and separate measures of j’s deviation above
and below the contribution norm, as well as the punisher’s own contribution
and the full set of demographic variables. In addition, the second and third
columns decompose the marginal eﬀects for the norm in the ﬁrst.
[Table 3 about here]
The ﬁrst column measures norm deviation relative to the mean contribution
of reference group members. Both treatment coeﬃcients are positive and sig-
niﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better - that is, participants in the two-way
treatments spent more on punishment than those in the one-way - consistent
with our group reciprocity hypothesis. Furthermore, the two-way sequential
coeﬃcient is substantially larger than the two-way simultaneous - the null that
the two are equal can be rejected at the 10 percent level - which implies that
individuals punish more when reciprocity is easier to achieve.
The estimated coeﬃcients on deviation above and below the norm are also
signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level) and have opposite signs. The latter is
important in the context of previous studies that ﬁnd evidence of "misdirected
punishment" (Gächter and Hermann, 2004) or, in other words, punishment of
those who also contribute more than the punisher. The implicit focus of all
these studies, however, was SPP or punishment within groups. Our results
are consistent with these if SPP and TPP are the action tendencies of diﬀerent
emotions that serve diﬀerent purposes - in the ﬁrst case, anger that enforces
conformism and in the second, indignation that enforces contribution norms.
9The results are similar if one clusters errors on the individual instead. Details available
on request from the authors.
12The surprise, perhaps, is that while individual characteristics did not seem
to inﬂuence contribution decisions, the same cannot be said about the decision
to punish norm violators. Under this norm, sex and math SAT score were both
signiﬁcant. In fact, the substantial female coeﬃcient is robust across norm
speciﬁcation: women do not contribute more than men, ceteris paribus, but
are more committed to norm enforcement.10
Inasmuch as a substantial number of the observations of punishment are left-
censored, it becomes useful, for purposes of interpretation, to decompose the
tobit coeﬃcients. To this end, the second and third columns report the mar-
ginal eﬀects on the likelihood that punishment is observed and on punishment
expenditures, conditional on the decision to punish, evaluated (for continuous
variables) at sample means.
We ﬁrst observe that conditional on the level of norm violation, partici-
pation in the two-way simultaneous and sequential TPP treatments increased
the likelihood that sanctions would be imposed 8.0 and 11.4 percent relative
to the one-way default, and that both likelihoods are statistically signiﬁcant.
To reprise one of the themes of this paper, punishment is not the result of
indignation alone. Further, the diﬀerence between these likelihoods is itself
signiﬁcant.
Those who contribute less than the prospective punisher are signiﬁcantly
more likely to be punished, and vice versa. In the one-way treatment, someone
who does not contribute to the group project at all is 28 = 25(0.011) percent
more likely to be punished by someone who has contributed her entire endow-
ment. In the two-way sequential, treatment, however, this ﬁgure increases to
almost 40 percent.
The sex eﬀect manifests itself as an 8.8 percent diﬀerential in the likelihood
that a particular norm violation is punished.
Conditional on the decision to punish - that is, on the observation of positive
punishment - and norm deviation, subjects in the two-way treatments spent sig-
niﬁcantly more on punish than those in the one-way, but the size of these eﬀects
is perhaps smaller than expected. In the two-way simultaneous treatment, for
example, 0.23 more EMUs were spent, and in the two-way sequential, 0.31 more
10In unreported regressions we also examined including the contribution of the punisher, but
the coeﬃcient was always small and insigniﬁcant indicating that our emphasis on situational
or relative norms is well-placed.
13EMUs were. The coeﬃcients on the extent of norm deviation are also signif-
icant but small: once the decision to sanction has been made, someone who
has contributed 20 fewer EMUs will receive 0.35 more EMUs punishment than
someone who has contributed 10 fewer in the one-way treatment, for example,
and 0.66 more in the two-way sequential.
Looking at the remaining columns in Table 3, we ﬁnd that all of our principal
conclusions, and indeed most of the incidental ones, are robust with respect to
the choice of norm. In the fourth column, for example, it is the deviation
of actual from expected contributions that determines norm violation, and the
estimates of both treatment coeﬃcients, both coeﬃcients (above and below) on
the extent of norm violation, and the coeﬃcient on sex are all close in size and
signiﬁcance to those in the ﬁrst.
The same holds true for the estimates in the ﬁfth column, in which the
norm is deﬁned in terms of the punisher’s own contribution, a particular im-
plementation of the Sugden (1984) norm. In his theoretical model of public
goods provision, each individual would prefer to contribute the minimum of all
other contributions, in which case individuals would perhaps treat their own
contributions as the relevant benchmark.
6 Concluding Remarks
To understand the nature of third party punishment is to understand how, to
invoke a popular phrase, "it takes a village." Enforcement of prosocial norms
often requires the intervention of bystanders who are nevertheless connected to
the aﬀected parties in loose networks, the sorts of networks that are common to
villages. Indeed, if, as the literature on misdirected punishment hints, it is the
desire to punish non-conformism that drives second parties, the enforcement of
some norms would become diﬃcult without third parties. While we do not ﬁnd
as much indignation-driven punishment as, say, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004),
a substantial number of our subjects were nevertheless prepared to sanction
antisocial behavior even in environments where traditional notions of reciprocity
were not possible. When gifts of norm enforcement can be exchanged across
groups, however, there was a substantial increase in both contributions and
punishment per violation.
Three possible extensions of our work come to mind. First, while our focus
14has been on punishment, there are some environments in which rewards are
more common. Is it the case, for example, that individuals will reward both
insiders and outsiders, or that more will be rewarded when reciprocal behavior
is possible? As a related matter, it remains to be seen whether our results are
robust with respect to the choice of frame: would it make much diﬀerence, for
example, if the sanctions or rewards were cast in terms of workplace relations?
Second, our reliance on student subjects will be a source of concern to some,
so that it is important to know whether the same results would obtain with
subjects - workers, for example - for whom contribution decisions and norms
could be more salient.
Third, there remains much to do on the theoretical front. The evolutionary
model of group reciprocity in Carpenter and Matthews (2002), for example, is
diﬃcult to reconcile with the diﬀerent motivations of second and third parties.
7 Appendix: Experimental Instructions for the
Simultaneous TPP Treatment
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. For participat-
ing today and being on time you will be paid a show-up fee of $5. You may earn
an additional amount of money depending on your decisions in the experiment.
All your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment the 8 participants will be randomly divided into 2
groups of 4. The experiment has two stages.
At the beginning each participant receives a 25 EMU endowment. In Stage
One each of you will decide how much of the 25 EMUs to contribute to a group
project and how much you want to keep for yourself. You are asked to contribute
whole EMU amounts (i.e., a contribution of 5 EMUs is alright, but 3.85 should
be rounded up to 4). Your payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of everyone else in your group
will be determined by how much each member contributes to the group project
and how much each member keeps.
To record your decision, you will type EMUs amounts in two text-input
boxes, one for the group project labeled GROUP ALLOCATION and one for
yourself labeled PRIVATE ALLOCATION. These boxes will be yellow. Once
y o uh a v em a d ey o u rd e c i s i o n ,t h e r ew i l lb eag r e e nS U B M I Tb u t t o nt h a tw i l l
15record your decision.
After all the participants have made their decisions, each of you will be
informed of your gross earnings for the period. Your Gross Earnings will consist
of two parts: 1) Earnings from your Private Allocation. You are the only
beneﬁciary of EMUs you keep. More speciﬁcally, each EMU you keep increases
your earnings by one. 2) Earnings from the Group Project. Each member of the
group gets the same payoﬀ from the group project regardless of how much he or
she contributed. The payoﬀ from the group project is calculated by multiplying
0.5 times the total EMUs contributed by the members of your group.
Y o u rE a r n i n g sc a nb es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s :1 ×(EMUs you keep) + 0.5×
(Total EMUs contributed by your group)
Let’s discuss three examples. Example 1: Say each member of your group
contributes 15 of their 25 EMUs. In this case, the group total contribution to
the project is 4×15 = 60 EMUs. Each group member earns 0.5×60 = 30 EMUs
from the project. The gross earnings of each member will then be the number
of EMUs kept, 25-15 = 10, plus the earnings from the group project, 30 EMUs,
for each member. Hence, each member would earn 10+30 = 40 EMUs.
Example 2: Now say everyone in the group contributes 5 EMUs. Here the
group total contribution will be 20 and each member will earn 0.5×20 = 10
EMUs from the group project. This means that the total earnings of each
member of the group will be 20 (the number of EMUs kept) plus 10 (earnings
from the group project) which equals 30 EMUs.
Example 3: Finally, say three group members contribute all their EMUs and
one contributes none. In this case, the group total contribution to the project
is 3×25 = 75 EMUs. Each group member earns 0.5×7 5=3 7 . 5E M U sf r o mt h e
project. The three members who contributed everything will earn 0+37.5 =
37.5 EMUs and the one member who contributed nothing will earn 25+37.5 =
62.5 EMUs.
In stage two you will be shown the allocation decisions made by all the
other participants, and they will see your decision. Also at this stage you will
be able to reduce the earnings of other participants, if you want to, and the other
participants will be able to reduce your earnings. You will be shown how much
each member of your group kept and how much they allocated to the group
project. You will also be shown how much each member of the other group kept
16and how much they contributed to their group project. Your allocation decision
will also appear on the screen and will be labeled ’YOU’.
At this point you will decide how much (if at all) you wish to reduce the
earnings of the other participants. You reduce someone’s earnings by typing the
number of EMUs you wish to spend to reduce that person’s earnings into the
input-text box that appears below that participant’s allocation decision.
For each EMU you spend you will reduce the earnings of the other participant
by 2 EMUs. You can spend as much of your accumulated earnings as you wish
to reduce the earnings of the other participants.
Consider this example: suppose you spend 2 EMUs to reduce the earnings of
a participant in the other group, you spend 9 EMUs reducing the earnings of a
participant in your group, and you don’t spend anything to reduce the earnings
of the remaining participants. Your total cost of reductions will be (2+9+0) or
11 EMUs. When you have ﬁnished you will click the blue DONE button.
How much a participant’s gross earnings are reduced is determined by the
total amount spent by all the other participants in this session. If a total of
3 EMUs is spent, then this person’s earnings will be reduced by 6 EMUs. If
the other participants spend 4 EMUs in total, the person’s earnings would be
reduced by 8 EMUs, and so on.
Again, for each EMU you spend you will reduce the earnings of the other
participant by 2 EMUs. You can spend as much of your accumulated earnings
as you wish to reduce the earnings of each of the other participants. When you
have ﬁnished click the blue DONE button.
Nobody’s earnings will be reduced below zero by the other participants. For
example, if your gross earnings were 40 EMUs and the other participants spent
50 EMUs to reduce your earnings, your gross earnings would be reduced to zero
and not minus 60.
Your NET EARNINGS after the third stage will be calculated as follows:
(Gross Earnings from Stage One) - (2×the Number of EMUs spent on reduc-
tions directed towards you) - (your expenditure on reductions directed at other
participants).
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, click the red
TAKE QUIZ button when you are done reading. You will then answer a few
questions about the experiment so that we make sure that everyone understands.
17Pay attention because you will not be allowed to continue until you provide the
correct answers.
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Contribution 11.08 12.43 12.68 13.93 14.50
(5.78) (5.46) (4.72) (4.69) (4.58)
Expected Average Contribution 11.48 12.28 11.38 12.03 11.45
(6.26) (5.90) (4.68) (5.23) (4.72)
Expected Average Punishment (for contributing nothing) - 3.48 3.63 4.03 4.88
(2.02) (1.66) (2.27) (4.03)
Incidence of Second Party Punishment - 0.50 0.33 0.30 0.43
(0.51) (0.47) (0.46) (0.50)
Incidence of Third Party Punishment - - 0.10 0.30 0.38
(0.31) (0.46) (0.49)
Total Expenditure on Second Party Punishment - 2.05 1.40 0.78 1.23
(2.92) (2.84) (1.39) (1.64)
Total Expenditure on Third party Punishment - - 0.20 0.65 1.18
(0.61) (1.41) (2.06)
Second Party Expenditure (per offense) / Target EMUs Kept - 0.26 0.15 0.11 0.13
(0.28) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10)
Third Party Expenditure (per offense) / Target EMUs Kept - - 0.07 0.08 0.14
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Female 0.30 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.30
(0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46)
E c o n o m i c s  M a j o r 0 . 1 00 . 3 00 . 2 80 . 3 00 . 1 0
(0.30) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.30)
Number of Economics Classes Completed 1.00 3.00 2.50 1.78 0.55
(2.05) (4.01) (3.65) (2.68) (0.64)
Grade Point Average 3.42 3.39 3.22 3.26 3.25
(0.40) (0.33) (0.39) (0.37) (0.34)
Verbal SAT 671.00 688.00 650.00 691.00 666.00
(65.66) (57.90) (81.09) (55.20) (73.48)
Math SAT 688.00 681.00 650.00 687.00 681.00
(69.53) (49.38) (83.56) (63.48) (59.35)
Punishment Treatments
Table 1: Mean Behavior & Demographics by Treatment (standard deviations)
20Contribution
(All Treatments)
Second Party Punishment 0.952
[0.926]
Third Party Punishment (one-way) 1.692 0.852 0.849
[0.930]* [0.891] [0.877]
Third Party Punishment (simultaneous) 2.518 1.616 1.510
[0.918]*** [0.895]* [0.882]*
Third Party Punishment (sequential) 3.423 2.462 2.102
[0.888]*** [0.932]*** [0.929]**
Expected Average Contribution 0.596 0.553 0.537
[0.055]*** [0.067]*** [0.063]***
Expected Average Punishment 0.318
[0.128]**
Female -0.651 -0.912 -0.906
[0.635] [0.700] [0.689]
Economics Major -0.598 -0.685 -1.159
[0.954] [0.992] [0.998]
Economics Classes Completed 0.034 0.037 0.110
[0.134] [0.139] [0.140]
Grade Point Average -1.249 -0.388 -0.473
[0.883] [1.021] [1.006]
Verbal SAT 0.006 0.004 0.004
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Math SAT 0.004 0.006 0.008
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Intercept 1.847 -0.187 -1.982
[3.725] [4.213] [4.209]
Observations 200 160 160
Chi
2, (p-value) 125, (<0.01) 83, (<0.01) 90 (<0.01)
Pseudo R
2 0.10 0.09 0.09











Mean Pr(0<TPP) E(TPP|0<TPP) Expectation Contribution
Third Party Punishment (simultaneous) 1.537 0.080 0.227 1.703 2.270
[0.813]* [0.047]* [0.123]* [0.821]** [0.875]***
Third Party Punishment (sequential) 2.077 0.114 0.313 2.563 2.699
[0.810]*** [0.052]** [0.126]** [0.833]*** [0.879]***
Deviation Above Norm -0.483 -0.022 -0.067 -0.194 -0.144
[0.188]*** [0.007]*** [0.024]*** [0.082]** [0.079]*
Deviation Below Norm 0.244 0.011 0.035 0.197 0.155
[0.083]*** [0.004]** [0.012]*** [0.054]*** [0.051]***
Female 1.593 0.088 0.240 1.958 1.996
[0.515]*** [0.033]*** [0.080]*** [0.532]*** [0.561]***
Economics Major 0.978 0.054 0.148 1.649 1.063
[0.676] [0.045] [0.109] [0.690]** [0.697]
Economics Classes Completed -0.211 -0.010 -0.030 -0.259 -0.241
[0.160] [0.007] [0.022] [0.162] [0.177]
Grade Point Average -0.142 -0.006 -0.020 0.450 0.421
[0.788] [0.037] [0.112] [0.809] [0.837]
Verbal SAT 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.004] [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.004] [0.004]
Math SAT -0.008 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008
[0.004]** [0.0002]** [0.0005]** [0.004] [0.004]**
Intercept -1.791 -5.113 -1.931
[2.863] [2.982]* [2.943]
Individual Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 400 400 400 400 400
Wald chi
2, (p-value) 31.76, (<0.01) 33.77, (<0.01) 27.53, (<0.01)
Definition of the Contribution Norm
Table 3: The Determinants of Third Party Punishment
Notes: Random Effects Tobit Regressions censored at 0; [standard errors]; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Deviation from Reference Group 
Mean (Marginal Effects)
22